Despite the growing research interest in Internet auctions, particularly those on eBay, little is known about the quantifiable consumer welfare accrued from such mechanisms. Using an ongoing novel field experiment, we collect and examine a unique dataset to empirically quantify and understand determinants of consumer surplus in eBay auctions. Our analysis, based on a sample of 5187 eBay auctions, indicates that the median surplus level per auction on eBay auctions is $3.53, which roughly translates to $1.47 billion in accrued consumer surplus for the year 2003 alone. We find that consumer surplus is significantly different across currencies and item categories, negatively influenced by seller experience, auction duration and competition, and positively influenced by bidder experience, bidder aggressiveness and item price.
1
Classical microeconomic theory uses the notion of consumer surplus as the welfare measure that quantifies benefits to a consumer from an exchange. Alfred Marshall (1936) defined consumer surplus as "the excess of the price which he (a consumer) would be willing to pay rather than go without the thing, over that which he actually does pay…" It is also traditional to visualize consumer surplus as the roughly triangular area lying under a downward sloping demand curve and above the rectangle that represents actual money expenditure. Yet, despite its established theoretical standing, little is known empirically about consumer surplus levels in real markets. In this paper we report on consumer surplus levels in eBay auctions, a vastly popular Internet based electronic market. eBay's popularity is evident in the reported $23. electronic markets can lead to significant consumer welfare gains, very little has been generally said about the quantifiable benefits such markets provide to consumers. One possible reason for the lack of empirical consumer surplus levels, in traditional as well as electronic markets, is that unlike producer surplus, it is not directly observable in posted price markets. In such markets, willingness to pay has to be inferred indirectly through surveys, contingent valuation techniques and price changing experiments such as promotions and discounts. Surveys of willingness to pay have credibility issues and have lead to a stream of research dealing with contingent valuation precision and bias reduction [see Peter A. Diamond and Jerry A. Hausman (1994) ].
There has also been some controversy about which consumer welfare measure is most appropriate. Hausman (1981) explains the difference between primal Marshallian consumer surplus and the dual Hicksian compensating variation measures. He then goes on to provide an approach to derive the unobserved compensated Hicksian demand curve from the observed demand curve, which in turn leads to an exact measure of consumer surplus. These developments have lead to initial empirical research in measuring consumer surplus levels in specialized markets [Brynjolfsson et al.'s (2003) for obscure book titles]. However, it is our belief that more needs to be said and done in a wider context about consumer surplus.
In this paper we demonstrate the suitability of using direct mechanisms [Roger Myerson (1981) ], such as auctions in which it is a dominant strategy for market players to reveal their true valuations, to quantify and understand determinants of consumer surplus. Auction theory is built upon the fact that a consumer with a valuation v i for an item, strategizes and formulates a bid b i so as to maximize her surplus (v i -b i ) [R. Preston McAfee and John McMillan (1987) ]. Note the similarity here with consumer theory, which evaluates consumer surplus as the value or willingness to pay for a change in price of a good from say p 0 to p 1 . Thus, the consumer theory notion of the amount the consumer would pay (or would need to be paid) to be just as well off after the price change as she was before the price change, is no different from the auction theory notion that measures the winning bidder's surplus as how much could the price have gone up, without changing the current allocation 1 . Not surprisingly, induced by the vast amount of bidding data on the Internet, connections between auction and consumer theory are beginning to be formally explored by researchers and practitioners 2 . Christopher P. Adams and William Vogt (2004) show the highly elastic nature of the market for digital cameras using three different methods for estimating demand for differentiated products on eBay. Bidding data from eBay also has value to antitrust regulators who, while evaluating a merger, seek to understand the 1 We hereafter refer to surplus, bidder's surplus and consumer surplus interchangeably in this paper. 2 eBay sells its price data to Andale.com which attempts to provide Blue Book like services for consumer products.
competitive structure of a particular product market [Christopher P. Adams and Laura L. Bivins There have been several studies that have described, in depth, eBay's second-price ascending proxy-bid auction mechanism. A key feature is that at the termination of the auction, the highest bidder wins and pays a price equal to the second highest bid plus one bid increment.
The only exception is the case that the two highest bids are equal, wherein the earlier bidder is awarded the item at a price equal to her bid. Another established feature, resulting primarily from eBay's hard closing time, is that last second bidding or sniping is widely prevalent. Al Roth and
Axel Ockenfels (2002) provide interesting theoretical and empirical insights into sniping behavior on eBay. They observe that in 240 antique auctions on eBay, 89 had bids in the last minute and 29 in the last 10 seconds. 3 Similar findings have been reported by Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003) , Shmueli and Jank (2004) and Schindler (2003) . Explanations for late bidding range from tacit collusion against sellers to the presence of naïve bidders who don't understand proxy bidding, to common value components in the items being auctioned. For the purpose of this study, we make use of the fact that sniping is prevalent.
eBay posts almost the complete bid history after the auction closes, with the exception being the value of the highest bid. For instance consider the bid history of the following auction for a Nokia 6610 GSM cell phone.
Insert Figure 1 about here
Conspicuous in its absence is the exact amount bid by the winner 'kanchenjunga 4 .' Since the winner's bid is not disclosed by eBay, there is no direct measure of the revealed willingness to pay of the winning bidder from the auction that is publicly available. To overcome this limitation, we design an ongoing field experiment that allows real-world bidders to use
Cniper.com, our web based bidding agent, to snipe eBay auctions. Internet-based field experiments that deal with real bidders in real markets provide a contrast to the controlled environment of laboratory experiments with student subjects. This is evident in the work of David Lucking-Reiley 5 (1999) and John A. List and Lucking-Reiley (2002). They show how age old questions such as revenue equivalence and the importance of decisions costs respectively, can be practically examined using field experiments with real bidders and without any theoretical assumptions that would be enforced in the laboratory. In the context of the current study, given the lack of published high bids, researchers seeking to model consumer surplus on eBay would 3 Our own conversations with a senior eBay executive reveal that 80 percent of all bids arrive in the last hour of the auction. 4 The first author's eBay id. 2001)]. In the case of our data, since by design we limit ourselves to sniping winners, it is straightforward to prove that the absence of any response time to other bidders makes truth-telling sniping a weakly dominant strategy, and the eBay auction resembles a second-price sealed bid auction.
Naturally, this raises questions about the generalizability of our results to the overall population of eBay auctions, where sniping may or may not occur. We address this empirically by testing whether a randomly drawn validation sample of 1000 eBay auctions has similar distributions of key auction parameters as do our field experiment data. We find that in all auction parameters, including item price, bidder and seller reputations, item categories, number of bidders and opening bid, there is no significant difference between our validation and field data 7 . This, coupled with the academic and practitioner support of the notion that sniping is widespread, leads us to believe that our findings are generalizable across eBay auctions.
A simple analysis of the surplus data yields a sample median of surplus equal to $3.53.
Our results indicate that consumer surplus in online auctions can be well-approximated by a 3- accrued to the group of eBay categories that are antique or collectible in nature. This is followed by a moderate surplus group of items comprised of computers, electronics and books, among others. The lowest surplus is in the group of household items such as toys, health and beauty items and games. We find that sellers with higher feedback ratings, a proxy for experience and trust, tend to yield lower bidder surplus, and that experienced bidders tend to realize higher surplus. We find that the main effects of price, opening bid, and number of bidders have a significant influence on surplus, but so do the interactions of price with opening bid and price with number of bidders. These main effects must therefore be interpreted cautiously.
Interestingly, we find that surplus is positively associated with price in auctions with many bidders, but this relationship is moderated by the opening price. We find that surplus is generally positive in auction duration and negative in sniping time, but only for "mainstream auctions"
with five to seven day duration and sniping time equal to eight 9 or nine seconds. We elaborate on these findings, and on how we reach them, in the remainder of the paper.
The next section of this paper describes the working of the bidding agent and the data sample. Section II characterizes the distribution of consumer surplus, provides estimates of levels of consumer surplus on eBay auctions and explores the determinants of consumer surplus.
Section III concludes by pointing out limitations of the study and directions for future research.
I. Description of the Bidding Agent and Data Sample
The prevalence of sniping on eBay has lead to several independent third party sniping agents that help bidders place last second bids on eBay. The interested reader is referred to 9 The default on cniper.com 10 Roth and Ockenfels (2002) emphasize the probability of bids not getting through in the last seconds. 11 BidSlammer.com, AuctionSniper.com etc. 12 This was when the site was significantly redesigned. 13 A fast growing server-side scripting tool. 14 The standard open source relational database.
costs low 15 . This helps us provide it as a free service, and provides no incentive for any bid shading to account for bidding agent commissions. The lack of commissions also attracts entry for the tool, which in turn provides us with continuously richer observations of real economic agents acting in real markets. We believe that our approach, a first in the research community, will serve as a model for researchers doing Internet based field experiments and so called action research.
While the full technical details of Cniper.com's working are beyond the scope of this paper, a brief overview of its usage is necessary to motivate its usefulness in measuring consumer surplus. Agents such as Cniper, allow bidders to reveal a) their willingness-to-pay for a specific item being auctioned on eBay, and b) the number of seconds before the close of the auction they want their bid to be placed on eBay. For illustrative purposes, we continue with our earlier example of the Nokia 6610 GSM phone auction which was sniped and won by eBay user 'kanchenjunga' using Cniper and whose bid history is displayed in Figure 1 . We show the process of the bidder sniping and the actual winning bid placed in Figure 2 .
Insert Figure 2a and 2b around here
Figures 2a and 2b reveal that bidder 'kanchenjunga' fired $180 for the item and won the auction by outsniping bidder 'ray7748' by 3 seconds. Recall, from Figure 1 that the winning bid or price is $170. Thus, it is evident that bidder 'kanchengjuna' derived a surplus of $10 from this auction.
I. A. Description of the Data
The data used in our analysis consist of 5187 eBay auctions that took place between January 9, 2004 and April 21, 2004 16 . In all these auctions the winner was a Cniper.com user.
These auctions were carried out in one of three major currencies: US Dollar (USD), Great Britain Pound (GBP), and the Euro. The items auctioned were in a wide variety of categories, spanning most 17 of eBay's 30 high level categories 18 . To maintain a minimal cardinality level in each category, we grouped the items 19 , using eBay's categories, into 18 major categories plus an additional 19 th category for items in which the category description was missing 20 . To the best of our knowledge, currency and category have not featured in the extant analysis of eBay data.
Insert Table 1 about here
In addition, we recorded from eBay the following information on each auction: Opening and closing prices in their original currency and their USD equivalent 21 , whether hidden reserve was used, the starting and ending time 22 and date, the number of bids placed in the auction, the number of unique bidders participating in the auction, and seller and winner rating. From
Cniper.com we obtained the number of seconds before the auction close that the winning bid was placed, and the winning bid itself. We then calculated the surplus by subtracting the closing price from the winning bid. 16 This corresponds to little more than a three month period, the duration for which eBay posts bid histories of completed auctions. 17 Only the two categories "Travel" and "Tickets" were not populated in our dataset. 18 See http://pages.ebay.com/categorychanges/ for a list of high-level eBay categories. Notice that it includes the category "Everything Else" that contains auctions that do not fit any other classification. Also notice that the category "Automotive" is not contained in this list. 19 See Table 1 for a description of the grouping. 20 While auctions with missing category descriptions could have been assigned to the "Everything Else" category, we decided to keep these auctions separate in order to maintain objectivity. 21 eBay provides approximate conversions on the web page. 22 Always equal. 
Insert Table 2a and 2b around here
We next analyze the distribution of surplus levels in online auctions, quantify its level and explore its determinants. . This is surprising, since we would expect surplus to be distributed uniformly in such small intervals.
II. Analysis of Consumer Surplus

Insert Figure 3 about here
Thus, our first insight into the distribution of consumer surplus is that the data are apparently semi-continuous. By semi-continuous we mean that while surplus can theoretically assume any value in a given interval, some underlying (and unobserved) data-generating mechanism introduces discretization, causing the data to be concentrated on certain values. We explore the possible causes of this later in this section.
In order to transform surplus from auctions in various currencies into a single scale, we converted all currencies into USD using the conversion rate listed on the auction's eBay page.
Figure 4 displays a histogram of log(USD surplus+1). The shift of 1 allows us to apply the log transform to the zero surplus data. The data are clearly bi-modal, with a large "lump" of zero values (0= log(1)).
Insert Figure 4 about here
A closer look at the data reveals that 383 (out of 5187) auctions ended at a closing price exactly equal to the revealed willingness to pay indicated by the winner to Cniper. These can be categorized as highly competitive zero surplus auctions where the two highest valuations are identical. Given that our research objective is to quantify and understand the determinant of consumer surplus, the above "zero-inflated" data present a challenge, in that we cannot directly model surplus in a regression model (which assumes normal residuals). Our options are to separate the zero-surplus auctions, or at least modify our model to accommodate the "zeroinflated" data.
Our solution is to use a novel approach, where we transform the data into a slightly coarser scale. In particular, we round surplus to the next integer value. The reasoning behind this transformation is data driven: Recall the initial observation about the semi-continuous nature of the data, with large counts of surpluses at values of 0, 0.01, 0.5, 1, etc. We believe that the reason is most likely the bid increments that eBay imposes 23 . It could also be the case that most bidders enter integer values as their bids, and this further contributes to semi-continuous nature of the data. Reasoning that surpluses within a $1 unit range carry the same (or at least similar) information, we transform the original surplus data by applying the ceiling function (which gives the next highest integer). We then take log(integer surplus + 1) to accommodate for the zero 23 See Bapna et al (2003b) for the impact of discrete bid increments on online auctions surplus data. Figure 6 shows the histogram of the transformed integer surplus values. The new values follow a right-skewed distribution.
Insert Figure 5 about here
Further investigation of the probabilistic structure of the data reveals that a 3-parameter
Weibull distribution approximates the transformed data fairly well. This can be seen in Figure 6 which displays a weibull probability plot of the data (left), and in comparison a lognormal probability plot of the same data (right).
Insert Figure 6 about here
This approximation is of special interest, since the Weibull distribution often describes the time to an occurrence of the "weakest link" in competing failure processes; for example, the time to death of the first component in a system with multiple components and competing failures. In our case we have a set of bids in an auction. Among the difference between each of the bids and the winning price, the surplus is the only non-positive value, and thus the minimum of these differences. In this sense the winning/highest bid is the "weakest link" because it has the smallest distance from price compared to all other bids that were placed in the auction. Taking logs maintains the order, and therefore the result holds.
The estimated parameters of the fitted Weibull distribution are shape = 1.69, scale = 2.20, and location/threshold = -0.18. Since the surplus distribution is very skewed, the median is a better measure than the mean for the center of the distribution. . It can also be argued that sellers with more experience 25 , also proxied by feedback ratings, make better mechanism design choices to maximize expected auction price.
Thus, we expect that seller rating to have a negative influence on bidder surplus. controlled for product heterogeneity, our dataset is diverse, covering all but two of eBay's 30 major item categories, with prices ranging from 1 cent to $7600. This allows us to test the implications of stakes and product attributes on bidding behavior in a far more generalizable setting. Smith and Walker (1993) have predicted that individuals' behavior will more closely match the predictions of rational behavior as the stakes of the decision increase 26 . Marketing theories suggest that as stakes get higher, consumers get more involved in finding the best price for their product [Marcel Cohen (2000) ]. Based on these studies, we expect auction price to have a positive influence on bidder's surplus.
With respect to item categories, while we assume the independent private values setting to establish truth-telling as a dominant strategy for second-price auctions, it is well-know that one's rivals confound any priors with respect to item category wise surplus levels. We will thus let the data speak.
4) Bidder characteristics:
We collect information on the winning bidder's rating as a proxy for their experience on eBay. We expect more experienced bidders to have more confidence in their valuations and bids and hence we expect them to derive higher surplus. In addition, we also 26 In the context of auctions this maps to surplus maximizing behavior.
measure aggressiveness of the bidder by looking at how many seconds prior to the close of the auction they snipe. Given that there is a small likelihood of bids not getting through due to congestion on eBay, even when fired by agents such as Cniper 27 , we expect risk seeking behavior with a greater desire to win and consequently higher bid levels and surplus.
5) Market characteristics:
We are fortunate to have significant data in three prominent currencies, namely USD, GBP and the EURO. This allows us to test, for the first time, whether bidders differ in their bidding characteristics across countries. While there has been prior research in looking at the efficiency of auction formats across different countries [Klemperer (2002) ], this study represents a first in comparing bidder surplus levels across countries. Given that eBay was founded in the US and subsequently expanded to UK and Europe, it is reasonable to expect that the US market and its bidders have greater experience with bidding and strategizing.
Lastly, as can be expected, we propose that the level of competition in an auction, reflected in the number of bidders negatively influences the surplus accrued to the winning bidder. We also have data on the total number of bids in an auction. However, total number of bids is highly correlated with the total number of bidders and thus does not add any additional explanatory power to our regression models.
II.B Modeling Approach
Our goal is to find a model that explains the effect of the above-mentioned set of explanatory variables on consumer surplus. The main challenge with surplus data such as ours, is the extremely large number of auctions resulting in zero-surplus. That is, auctions which ended exactly at the value placed by the winner. Recall that in our dataset, 383 auctions (from a total of 5187) carried zero surplus. Furthermore, these auctions are diverse in their other characteristics 27 Cniper offers a choice of as low as 2 seconds before closing, but calls it "insane."
(across categories, currencies, etc.). Although "zero-inflated" models exist for discrete data (e.g., order to find variables that determine surplus. While this two-stage approach is valid, one of its disadvantages is the loss of statistical power. Also, it is less elegant than a single integrated model. We therefore strived for an alternative approach that combines zero-surplus and positivesurplus under one roof.
As described in the Section II, the rounding of surplus values and taking a log transform yields a distribution that is suitable for regression modeling. Using the transformed data, we applied stepwise regression (with all pairwise interaction terms) for model selection 28 .
The best model is given in Table 1 
II.C. Results
We organize this section by reporting first on the main effects and subsequently on those variables that have significant moderating interactions. We begin with the effect of the categorical variables of currency and product categories.
Currency: Consumer surplus is not the same across different currencies. We see that US currency auctions carry a significantly higher surplus relative to that of EURO and GPB auctions. In fact the coefficient equals .20 which implies that this difference is exp(.20) = 1.22.
The surplus accrued to US bidders is about 22% higher than in the European market! We believe that one source of these difference is the longer experience the US has had with electronic markets. eBay in the U.S. is, arguably, more mature than it is in Europe. Therefore, the higher consumer surplus may be explained by the fact that there is greater seller participation shifting the supply curve to the right and effectively lowering supplier surplus and increasing consumer surplus and social welfare. Greater experience with electronic markets may also translate to greater confidence in bidding. There are potentially other cultural factors that need further exploration.
Product Categories: Three main groups of categories determine the surplus level:
• Highest Surplus: Antiques/Art, Automotive, Collectibles, Everything Else, Jewelry and Pottery/Glass have the highest surplus by an estimated factor of 1.3-1.5 relative to the reference group. 30 We say standard since many other empirical studies do not consider currency or ebay categories.
• Moderate Surplus: Computers, Electronics, Books, Clothing/Accessories, Coins/Stamps, Photography, Sporting Goods, Business & Industry and missing category descriptions. These categories comprise the reference group.
• Lowest Surplus: Toys/Hobbies (TH), Music/Movies/Games (MG), Home/Garden (HG), and Health/Beauty (HB) have the lowest surplus, by an estimated factor of 0.75-0.85 relative to the reference group.
The highest surplus group appears to be made up of items, such as antiques and jewelry, which require expertise in assessing valuations and could potentially also have a common-value component. Thus, there is a potential winner's curse effect revealed here. The moderate and low surplus groups are made up of items that have several alternative channels, such as eBay's half.com and Amazon.com, and are therefore very competitive.
Next, we report on the effect of seller and winner experience, as reflected in their total feedback ratings on eBay.
Winner rating: More experienced winners are associated with a higher surplus. This indicates that with increasing experience bidders act more strategically, identifying wining bid levels and maximizing their utility from participating in eBay.
Seller rating: In contrast, and as expected, a seller's experience has a negative relationship with surplus. It can be expected that more experienced sellers make better mechanisms design choices. In addition, they can be expected to be more sophisticated in describing the product, by choosing a better layout and pictures to attract more bidders. This enables them to extract rents away from bidders. It is also likely that bidders simply trust more in sellers with a better reputation and this translates to more confidence in bidding. Overall, this effect is consistent with previous research [Ba and Pavlou (2002) ] that indicates that higher seller reputation results in a higher price!
We now report the main effects that are moderated by interaction terms amongst them.
Price, Number of Bidders, and Opening Bid: The main effect of price is positive, while the main effect of number of bidders and opening bid is negative. It is interesting to note that all of these three main effects are statistically significant, but so are the interactions of price with opening bid and price with number of bidders. These main effects must therefore be interpreted cautiously. The relationship between price and opening bid and its effect on surplus is visible in Figure 7 .
Insert Figure 7 around here
This is a scatterplot of surplus vs. price, with color denoting opening bid (continuous grayscale; gray = low, black = high). Overall, surplus is positively correlated with price, but the extent of this relationship depends on the opening bid amount: It is stronger in auctions with higher opening bids and weaker in auctions with low opening bids.
The relationship between price and number of bidders and its effect on surplus can be seen in Figure 8 , which is a scatterplot of surplus vs. price, with depth of grayscale denoting number of bidders (gray = few bidders, black = many bidders).
Insert Figure 8 around here
The positive relation between surplus and price appears to be stronger in auctions with many bidders, as can be seen by the slope of the cloud of grayish-black to black auctions. In contrast, in auctions with few bidders, the relationship is weaker (gray color has lesser slope).
The reason for this could be increased competition, which in turn causes the winning bidder to be less cautious, thereby generating higher surplus.
To summarize, the regression model reported in Table 3 Our analysis of winning bids from 5187 auctions spanning all but two of eBay's categories reveals interesting insights into the distribution of consumer surplus. We find that eBay's discrete bid increments tend to make surplus data multi-modal and semi-continuous, rather than continuous. In addition, we observe zero-inflation in 383 auctions, indicating a high degree of competitiveness on eBay. For an auction to have zero surplus, the two highest bids have to be exactly equal. These issues, coupled with data in three currencies and multiple categories catalyze us to innovatively transform our data using a log-ceiling transformation to make it suitable for regression modeling. We expect that our finding that a 3 parameter Weibull distribution best typifies consumer surplus to be useful to future researchers making distributional assumptions for analytical models examining the dynamics of online auctions.
We find that the price of the auction has the biggest positive influence on the bidder's surplus. This reinforces the belief that stakes matter, and as stakes get higher rationality (surplus maximizing behavior) becomes more prevalent. In addition we find that surplus levels are highest for items such as collectibles and antiques, and US bidders accrue significantly higher surplus than their European counterparts. The 22% difference between the more mature U.S. and non-U.S. auctions raises interesting propositions regarding the long-term trends we can expect with consumer surplus. This result suggests that as electronic markets, such as eBay, mature consumer surplus can be expected to be increasing over time. In this regard, it is interesting to consider the possibility that supplier surplus is shrinking as there is increased participation. How these longitudinal patterns will shape out and how they will impact buyer and seller entry promise to remain interesting questions for future research. Such a study will verify what we suspect; that the increases in consumer surplus are large enough to ensure an overall increase in social welfare.
We find that sellers' mechanism design choices, namely the choice of opening bids, auction duration as well as the sellers experience all have a significant influence on bidder's surplus. So do bidder characteristics such as experience and aggressiveness, as indicated by how close to the auction's end they select to fire their bid.
While we attempt to check the generalizability of our results by examining potential distributional differences in any of the independent variables between our field data and a randomly selected test data of 1000 auctions, we realize that this test data set is only a small fraction of the auctions conducted by eBay on a given date. We are limited in this aspect by having only the public access to eBay's search engine, which is clearly not designed for such a purpose.
As in traditional consumer theory, having benchmark consumer welfare levels is useful in examining the benefits to society of future policy changes that may be introduced by eBay. Our These comparative studies are presented as a series of box plots and QQ plots below. For all variables we found no significant difference between the Cniper data and the validation data, supporting the assumption that the Cniper data is no different than any other randomly drawn set of eBay data. 34 It could have been the begin date, end date, modified by seller date or any other occurrence of the string "May-13-04" in the title or description of the auction listing. 35 A large percentage of eBay auctions get no bids at all. Secondary eBay data sites such as www.andale.com and Hammertap.com's DeepAnalysis tool, give a range of so called "success rate" according to eBay category.
Box plots of Cniper variable vs. validation (eBay) variable.
(black arrow = mean, blue arrow = median; left plot corresponds to Cniper and the right to validation data; all variables are log transformed; ratings are also shifted by four to the right ) 
